Continuous double auctions with execution uncertainty by van Valkenhoef, Gert et al.
Continuous Double Auctions with Execution Uncertainty
Gert van Valkenhoef
valkenhoef@ai.rug.nl
Artiﬁcial Intelligence
University of Groningen
The Netherlands
Sarvapali D. Ramchurn
sdr@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Electronics and Computer Science
University of Southampton
United Kingdom
Perukrishnen Vytelingum
pv@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Electronics and Computer Science
University of Southampton
United Kingdom
Nicholas R. Jennings
nrj@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Electronics and Computer Science
University of Southampton
United Kingdom
Rineke Verbrugge
rineke@ai.rug.nl
Artiﬁcial Intelligence
University of Groningen
The Netherlands
Abstract
We propose a novel variant of the Continuous Double Auction
(CDA), the Trust-based CDA (T-CDA), which we demon-
strate to be robust to execution uncertainty. This is desir-
able in a setting where traders may fail to deliver the goods,
services or payments they have promised. Speciﬁcally, the T-
CDA provides a mechanism that allows agents to commit to
trades they believe will maximize their expected utility. In
this paper, we consider agents that use their trust in other
agents to estimate the expected utility of a transaction. We
empirically evaluate the mechanism, both against the optimal
solution given perfect and complete information and against
the standard CDA. We show that the T-CDA consistently out-
performs the traditional CDA as execution uncertainty in-
creases in the system. Furthermore, we investigate the robust-
nessofthemechanismtounreliabletrustinformationandﬁnd
that performance degrades gracefully as information quality
decreases.
1. Introduction
Resource allocation is an important problem in computer
science. Traditionally, it has been studied in settings where
computational entities are cooperative and the allocation is
determined by a central authority (e.g., the operating system
kernel allocating available CPU time to different processes).
However, with the advent of Grid computing, peer-to-peer
systems, and ad-hoc networks, distributed systems are now
being populated by an increasingly large number of compu-
tational entities. In such circumstances, a fully centralized
approach to resource allocation may not be feasible, as the
central resource broker will become a bottleneck for system
performance (Wolski et al. 2003). Furthermore, such set-
tings are not necessarily cooperative: stakeholders may have
conﬂicting interests and may be motivated by their individ-
ual proﬁt. Therefore, an approach that acknowledges the au-
tonomy of the different actors within a multi-agent system is
required.
In more detail, if we consider a truly open infrastructure,
there may be a very large number of agents providing a cer-
tain resource and a large number of agents that need such
This paper presents work done while the author was at the Uni-
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a resource. For a number of reasons, some agents may
be more reliable (i.e., more likely to provide the goods as
promised, or to settle the payment) than others. For exam-
ple, a desktop computer providing its idle CPU time will
typically be less reliable than a dedicated machine in a data
center with equivalent CPU power. The situation is compli-
cated further by the fact that agents may enter or leave the
system at any time.
Now, in a setting where agents compete for a limited de-
mand and supply of a resource, market-based resource allo-
cation mechanisms are a natural choice (Clearwater 1995),
since they are designed such that desirable overall sys-
tem behavior emerges despite the agents’ selﬁsh, proﬁt-
motivated behaviors. Speciﬁcally, in adopting a decentral-
ized approach, we also want to ensure a good system-wide
allocation of resources, i.e., we aim to maximize social wel-
fare. Given that we need to deal with large numbers of
agents (buyers and sellers in the market-based paradigm),
who may enter or leave the market at any time and who
want to be able to trade at any time, the Continuous Double
Auction (CDA) is an appropriate choice (Dash et al. 2007).
Indeed, the CDA has already been shown to be a highly ef-
ﬁcient mechanism for such cases (Gode and Sunder 1993).
However, the CDA does not inherently deal with the vary-
ing degrees of reliability that may be exhibited by the differ-
ent agents. This means that a buyer will always choose a low
priced offer that is almost certainly faulty, over a reliable
offer that is priced slightly higher. Indeed, one of the key
roles of CDA-based exchanges is to organize trading so that
contract defaults (i.e., agents opting out of the contract due
to non-execution or non-payment) are avoided (Hull 2006).
They do so by having investors deposit funds in an account
that is adjusted at the end of each trading day to cover their
demand and supply in the market in case of defaults. How-
ever, this can often be a barrier to entry in the market for
new investors that lack the funds to join the market. More-
over, this requires a trusted third party to be established to
provide these guarantees.
Thus, to address these shortcomings, we propose a novel
mechanism in which agents themselves manage the risk of
defaulting. This implies that the market can be set up in an
ad-hoc manner and does not require traders to trust a speciﬁcagent (typically the auctioneer) to manage risks for them.
To this end, the Trust-based CDA (T-CDA), allows agents
to use a trust model in their decision making process to as-
sess whether to accept or reject offers based on cost and the
perceived reliability of the proposer. Speciﬁcally, each agent
has a private trust function that represents its best estimate of
the reliability of each potential trading partner. The T-CDA
decouples the commitment that is inherent in making an of-
fer in the CDA. Thus, trade is separated into a bidding and a
commitment phase, further decentralizing the decision mak-
ing. Speciﬁcally, thiscircumventstheneedforatrustedthird
party and agents do not need to reveal their trust informa-
tion. Note that this is different from a multi-attribute auction
where the trader’s reputation is part of the bid, as in that case
the traders would have to agree on a trusted source of rep-
utation information, or trust each other to report this value
truthfully. The mechanism proposed in this paper may be
viewed as thedecentralized version of a (centralized) combi-
natorial auction where agents submit their valuation for each
potential transaction partner to the auctioneer (however, we
do not require agents to reveal this information).
We empirically demonstrate our mechanism to be at least
as efﬁcient, and usually more efﬁcient, in terms of maximiz-
ing social welfare as the CDA. Moreover, agents in the T-
CDA never trade at negative expected utility, as can happen
to their CDA counterparts. Finally, we empirically evaluate
the T-CDA’s robustness against unreliable trust models and
observe that performance decreases linearly with the error
introduced in the trust model.
In this paper, we advance the state of the art in the follow-
ing ways:
1. We develop a decentralized market-based mechanism that
is robust to execution uncertainty.
2. Although this mechanism allows agents to use a trust
model in their decision making, it does not require agents
to reveal their trust function.
3. We separate the offer and commitment phases inherent in
traditional CDA trade, providing a new way of managing
risk that can replace or complement the guarantee funds
that are conventionally used.
The paper is structured as follows: ﬁrst we review related
work, then the problem is formalized. Againts this back-
ground, we give some desiderata of a mechanism for such
a setting. Subsequently, the new mechanism is detailed and
the agent behavior is deﬁned. We then turn to an empirical
evaluation and, ﬁnally, we conclude and state directions for
further work.
2. Related Work
Early investigation of the CDA was based on the market pro-
tocol discussed by Smith (1962). For example, Gode and
Sunder showed that most of the efﬁciency achieved by trade
in the CDA is due to the mechanism itself and not due to the
intelligent behaviors of the traders, by showing that the efﬁ-
ciency with a Zero Intelligence (ZI) strategy (where agents
bid randomly) was close to that of human traders (Gode
and Sunder 1993). In particular, a ZI-C (ZI Constrained)
agent randomly shouts any price from the range of prices
that will not result in a loss for the agent. Later, Cliff and
Bruten (1997) showed that there are signiﬁcant differences
between the behavior of ZI-C traders and humans. Speciﬁ-
cally, they point out that the high efﬁciency shown by Gode
and Sunder is due to the speciﬁc demand and supply curves
used and that ZI-C traders are much more erratic than hu-
man traders. To remedy this, a more intelligent strategy
was developed, the Zero Intelligence Plus strategy (Cliff and
Bruten 1997): a minimally intelligent strategy with human-
like trader behavior.
A number of other lines of work have extended the CDA
in some domain-dependent way. In particular, Dash et al.
adapt the CDA for a scenario where sellers have a lim-
ited capacity and a complex cost structure, deﬁned by a
ﬁxed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost (Dash
et al. 2007). In that work, the extension of the CDA
is empirically compared to a centralized mechanism that
is known to ﬁnd the optimal allocation, an approach we
also adopt in this paper. Finally, other work has pro-
posed similar market-based approaches to computational re-
source allocation (Buyya, Abramson, and Venugopal 2005;
Wolski et al. 2001; 2003) and architectures to put this in
practice have been designed (Buyya, Abramson, and Giddy
2000). Indeed, speciﬁc approaches based on the CDA have
also been proposed, e.g., (Tan and Gurd 2007).
As can be seen, there is a precedent for adaptation of
the CDA to solve new problems. In addition to this, there
is also past work on the integration of trust in mechanism
design (Dash, Ramchurn, and Jennings 2004) and, speciﬁ-
cally, auctions (Porter et al. 2008). However, to date, there
is no work that attempts to extend the CDA to a domain
where the expected utility of a transaction is dependent on
the reliability of the other party and where the reliability
of traders may vary greatly. This is because originally the
CDA was intended for commodity markets, where these is-
sues do not arise. Moreover, the application of the CDA
to computational resource allocation has focused on cases
where the services being traded can reasonably be treated as
commodities, which is clearly not the case in an open dis-
tributed system, where failure to deliver what was promised
is a real possibility. Therefore, a variant of the CDA is re-
quired in our context. Thus, we propose a mechanism that
allows traders to differentiate between potential transaction
partners based on their expected reliability (i.e., trust).
3. Modeling the Trading Environment
We denote the set of buyers as b1;b2;:::;bn 2 B and the
set of sellers as sn+1;sn+2; :::;sn+m 2 S. Then, the set
of agents is denoted as A = B [ S. As a convention, we
generally refer to a generic buyer as bi, a seller as sj and an
agent that can be of either type as ak.
Every agent participating in the market is given an endow-
ment. For a buyer, an endowment is an order to buy a single
unit of resource for at most the speciﬁed limit price, `b
i. For
a seller, an endowment is an order to sell a single unit of
resource for at least the speciﬁed cost price, `s
j.
Given their endowments, buyers place bids (offers to buy)and sellers place asks (offers to sell) in the market.1 Based
on the submitted bids and asks, the market mechanism deter-
mines when a transaction takes place between a buyer and
a seller. We will denote a transaction at price q between a
buyer bi 2 B and seller sj 2 S as ti;j(q). After agreeing on
a transaction ti;j(q), the buyer pays the seller and the seller
transfers some goods to the buyer. The way the shouts are
managed in the market can be regimented by different mar-
ket rules.
The setting described above is the one traditionally con-
sidered in market-based mechanisms. Moreover, in this
work, we do not assume that successful execution of a trans-
action is guaranteed. Instead, we assume that the execution
of a transaction is binary, that is, either failure or success.2
We denote the outcome for the buyer as eb
i 2 f0;1g and for
the seller as es
j 2 f0;1g. The probability that a buyer is
successful (i.e. P(eb
i = 1)) is denoted as p(bi) and that the
seller is successful (i.e. P(es
j = 1)) as p(sj). For example,
after ti;j(q), if eb
i = 1 and es
j = 0, buyer bi has paid for a
service, but sj did not provide that service. In general, every
agent ai is assigned a certain probability of success (POS)
p(ai) 2 [0;1], which indicates the likelihood that an agent
will honour its agreement.
Given the execution of a transaction, the agents derive
utility as follows:
ub
i(ti;j(q);es
j) =

`b
i   q ;es
j = 1
 q ;es
j = 0 ;
us
j(ti;j(q);eb
i) =

q   `s
j ;eb
i = 1
 `s
j ;eb
i = 0 ;
(1)
where `b
i is the limit price of bi (i.e., the maximum bi is
willing to pay) and `s
j is the cost price of sj (i.e., the min-
imum price at which sj is willing to sell). These functions
follow naturally if we assume that agents are not malicious;
i.e., regardless of their own success and regardless of their
partner’s success, they will incur the cost associated with the
action they agreed to perform.3 Although this deﬁnition of
utility is not necessarily appropriate in every setting, it was
chosen to represent a worst case scenario: if agents derive
non-negative utility in this scenario, they will certainly do
so in a more forgiving scenario. Given this, the expected
utility of a transaction t = ti;j(q) is given by:
 ub
i(t) = ub
i(t;1)p(sj) + ub
i(t;0)(1   p(sj))
= `b
ip(sj)   q
 us
j(t) = us
j(t;1)p(bi) + us
j(t;0)(1   p(bi))
= qp(bi)   `s
j :
(2)
In order to make informed decisions, an agent needs to
evaluate the utility it expects to derive from each of the
1Collectively, bids and asks are referred to as shouts.
2Failure is binary to simplify our analysis, but this work can
easily be generalised to be continuous, to reﬂect partial success or
failure if that is appropriate in a given setting.
3For example, when a buyer pays q and if he receives the goods
(or service), which are worth `
b
i to him, he will derive a utility of
`
b
i   q. Otherwise, his utility is  q.
possible transactions. Since, in general, we cannot as-
sume that agents have perfect and complete knowledge of
each other’s POS, agents hold an estimate of the POS of
the other agents. Thus, each agent ai has a trust function
(trusti : A ! [0;1]), which represents its best estimate of
the probability of success for each other agent. So ideally,
trusti(aj) = p(aj). This allows ai to estimate the expected
utility  u (Equation 2) of a transaction:
~ ub
i(ti;j(q)) = ub
i(ti;j(q);1)trusti(aj)+
ub
i(ti;j(q);0)(1   trusti(aj))
~ us
j(ti;j(q)) = us
j(ti;j(q);1)trustj(ai)+
us
j(ti;j(q);0)(1   trustj(ai)) :
(3)
Now, it is rational to agree to a transaction only if the esti-
mated expected utility ~ ui(t)  0. In this paper we remain
agnostic to the origin of this trust function; agents might
learn the reliability of others through the observation of mar-
ket interactions, or they could employ some outside source
of information. Rather than implementing one of these ap-
proaches, we simulate the trust model by endowing agents
with trust information that has certain properties (see ‘Em-
pirical Evaluation’).
Note that our model is equivalent to the setting in which
the CDA is normally evaluated, when
trusti(aj) = p(aj) = 1; 8ai;aj 2 A :
4. Mechanism Desiderata
Given our problem setting, we deﬁne a number of desider-
ata that we believe our mechanism should exhibit. In par-
ticular, the market mechanism should be efﬁcient: it should
maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the individual
agents, since we want to maximize social welfare. It should
also be individually rational, i.e., individual agents will not
participate in loss-making transactions. This ensures that we
do not disincentivize agents from participating in our mar-
ket. Furthermore, an equal and, thus, fair distribution of
proﬁts between buyers and sellers is desirable (again to en-
sure we have approximately equal numbers of each). Addi-
tionally, since our model incorporates the notion of POS, we
desire the mechanism to be robust against agents having an
inaccurate representation of each others’ POS, since in the
real world, it is unrealistic to assume that agents have per-
fect and complete information about the reliability of other
agents.
In order to evaluate the efﬁciency of the mechanism, we
need to deﬁne and ﬁnd the optimal solution, given complete
and perfect information of all agents. This provides an up-
per bound on the efﬁciency we can expect from our mech-
anism. Given our model, we aim to ﬁnd the allocation that
maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the individual
agents, subject to certain constraints.
First, let us consider how to choose the transaction price
given that two agents interact. In order to optimize efﬁ-
ciency, we should maximize the sum of the agents’ individ-
ual utilities:
Ui;j(q) =  ub
i(ti;j(q)) +  us
j(ti;j(q))
= `b
ip(sj)   `s
j + q(p(bi)   1) : (4)From the above formula, we see that when the probability of
success of the buyer p(bi) = 1, the transaction price q has
no inﬂuence on the total expected utility of the transaction.
However, when p(bi) < 1, a higher transaction price leads
to a lower expected utility. Therefore, if we choose q to
optimize Ui;j, sellers will derive negative expected utility.
Hence, participation is not individually rational.
To remedy this, we could demand that  us
j(ti;j(q))  0,
however when p(bi) < 1, the result will be that sellers will
always break even and thus have no incentive to take part in
the market. Instead, we demand that the expected utilities of
both parties are equal, to achieve a fair distribution of utility
between buyers and sellers:
 ub
i(ti;j(q)) =  us
j(ti;j(q)) : (5)
This constraint determines a unique solution for the trans-
action price q. Then, given that in our current model, each
agent can take part in only one transaction, we can ﬁnd the
set of pairs T = f(bi;sj) j bi 2 B^sj 2 Sg that maximizes
U =
P
(bi;sj)2T Ui;j.
Here U gives an upper bound on the performance of the T-
CDA, under the constraint that utility is equally distributed
between buyers and sellers. However, the solutions the T-
CDA ﬁnds do not necessarily obey this constraint, because
it cannot enforce it since the solution is not centrally deter-
mined. Therefore, in evaluating the mechanism, we must
seperately compare both buyer and seller utilities to 0:5U.
5. Designing the Trust-Based CDA
As we pointed out earlier, traditional market mechanisms
ignore the execution phase present in every interaction. In
traditional settings, this is justiﬁed because the implications
of execution uncertainty can be dealt with outside the scope
of the market. However, the ad-hoc nature of the markets
considered here makes this unacceptable. Given this, here
we ﬁrst describe the CDA and then propose our extension,
the Trust-Based CDA, that does allow agents to factor the
execution phase into their decision making.
In more detail, the market protocol that deﬁnes the CDA
consists of a number of simple rules. In order to keep track
of the offers that have been made, bids and asks are queued
into order books, which are sorted lists of orders. Bids are
sorted from highest to lowest, asks from lowest to highest.
The following rules deﬁne the CDA protocol in detail:
Shout Accepting Rule Determines which bids and asks are
allowed in the market. Primarily, the price must be within
the interval [0;maxprice]4. Furthermore, the commonly
implemented NYSE shout accepting rule imposes that a
new shout must improve upon the current best shout by
that agent. When a trader submits a new shout, provided
that it improves upon the current shout by that trader, the
current shout is simply replaced by the new one.
Information Revelation Rule Determines what informa-
tion is published to buyers and sellers. Here, we assume
this to be the current bid and ask prices.
4maxprice is an arbitrary price limit set by the market.
Clearing Rule The market clears continuously, whenever
the highest bid price is at least as high as the lowest ask.
Then a transaction takes place, at a transaction price,
determined according to the pricing rule. The matched
shouts are removed from the order books.
Pricing Rule Determines the transaction price. The aver-
age of the matched bid and matched ask prices is often
used in the CDA, and will be used here.
The CDA may be seen as consisting of two components.
First, the bidding component manages the agents’ interac-
tion with the order books, through the shout accepting rule.
Second, the clearing component determines how transac-
tions arise, through the clearing and pricing rules.
Now, in our setting, the CDA is modiﬁed to additionally
let agents accept or reject transactions based on the identity
of the other agent. To this end, agents not only submit their
bids or asks to the market, but also have to explicitly indi-
cate their willingness to interact with a speciﬁc agent before
a transaction takes place. We call this declaration of will-
ingness a commitment. This allows us to leave most of the
rules and structure of the CDA intact and also maintains the
decentralized nature of the CDA, by leaving the manage-
ment of trust information and the decision making up to the
agents themselves. Indeed, our mechanism does not require
agents to reveal this information. As in the CDA, the T-CDA
merely provides the necessary means for the agents to com-
municate their desires effectively. Conversely, this means
that agent strategies will be more complex and play an im-
portant role in determining individual agent utilities as well
as system efﬁciency, as is the case for the CDA.
We may think of the mechanism as consisting of three
components: thebiddingandclearingcomponentsidentiﬁed
earlier and a new one, the commitment component, which
manages the interaction with the commitment book, through
the commitment accepting rule. This is visualized in Fig-
ure 1.
In more detail, if bi 2 B has placed a bid ob
i and sj 2 S
has placed an ask os
j, we denote the commitment of bi to a
transaction based on ob
i and os
j as ci(ob
i;os
j). A commitment
by sj would be cj(ob
i;os
j). Two matching commitments re-
sult in a transaction. We do not allow more than one com-
mitment by an agent on its own shout, since there can be
only one transaction based on a particular shout. However,
we do allow agents to withdraw a commitment, for example
because the other agent is not responding. Agents may reject
a commitment made by others on their shout.
In addition to the order books, the T-CDA has a com-
mitment book, in which a list of all current commitments
is maintained. We deﬁne an additional rule and adapt the
Clearing Rule to deal with commitments:
Commitment Accepting Rule A commitment ck(ob
i;os
j) is
accepted when the prices of the shouts concerned match
(i.e. ob
i  os
j) and one of the shouts was made by the
agent committing (i.e. k = i _ k = j). Furthermore, any
agent may have only one commitment for a speciﬁc shout
in the commitment book at any one time. Commitments
can be withdrawn by the agent that made them, or rejectedFigure 1: Information in the Trust-based CDA ﬂows through three different components. The Commitment component distin-
guishes the T-CDA from the traditional CDA.
by the agent that is being committed to. In either case, the
commitment is removed from the commitment book.
Clearing Rule Two commitments match when both the
buyer and the seller commit. So, commitments ci(ob
i;os
j)
and cj(ob
i;os
j) match and would result in a transaction
ti;j(q), where q is a transaction price determined by the
Pricing Rule. After the matching, both the commitments
and the shouts concerned are removed from the books.
To illustrate the trading process, consider a scenario with
one buyer, b0, with p(b0) = 1 and `b
0 = 8 and one seller,
s1, with p(s1) = 0:85 and `s
1 = 5. For simplicity, assume
both agents have perfect knowledge of p(). After some bid-
ding, we have the offers ob
0 = 7 and os
1 = 6:8 in the order
books. Now, in the traditional CDA, the market would im-
mediately clear and a transaction would take place at price
q = 6:9. However, in the T-CDA, agents consider their
expected utility (Equation 2) in order to decide whether to
commit. It happens that  us
1(t0;1(6:9))  0, so s1 will com-
mit to c1(ob
0;os
1). However,  ub
0(t0;1(6:9)) < 0, so b0 will
reject the commitment, removing it from the commitment
book. If s1 were to improve its ask to os
1 = 6:4, both agents
have positive expected utility (at price q = 6:7) and they will
both commit, resulting in a transaction t0;1(6:7).
6. Behavior
In the traditional CDA, an agent’s strategy is speciﬁed
through its bidding behavior, which dictates the offers an
agent submits in the market. In additon to this, a commit-
ment behavior is also required when trading in the market,
to determine when an agent commits.
A basic bidding strategy used in the CDA is the ZI-C be-
havior, which randomly picks a shout price from the range
of acceptable prices (i.e., from [0;`b
i] for buyers and from
[`s
j;maxprice] for sellers). We augment this bidding strat-
egy with a commitment behavior. This allows us to evaluate
the structure of the mechanism, rather than agents’ behavior,
as per Gode and Sunder for the traditional CDA. The ZI-C
strategy is easily extended to work in the T-CDA. For more
advanced strategies, however, this is non-trivial. Thus, al-
though evaluation with intelligent strategies is desirable, we
leave this for further work.
The commitment strategy is based on a single heuristic: if
the expected utility is non-negative, an agent ai is keen on
transacting.5 Hence, the following actions are tried in the
order given:
1. Givencommitments toits ownshout, ai picksthe bestand
commits if ~ ui(t)  0;
2. If ai is already committed, it does nothing more;
3. Given compatible shouts, ai picks the best and commits
if ~ ui(t)  0;
4. ai submits an offer based on the ZI-C strategy.
If necessary, the agent ai will withdraw a previous commit-
ment, while any unaccepted commitments on its own shout
will be rejected.
7. Empirical Evaluation
In this section we detail the empirical evaluation of the T-
CDA. In particular we aim to see how it performs with re-
spect to the desiderata speciﬁed above, under ‘Mechanism
Desiderata.’ Speciﬁcally, we investigate:
 The efﬁciency of the mechanism;
 The distribution of utility between buyers and sellers;
 The robustness of the mechanism to errors in the trust in-
formation.
In doing so, we assume that:
 Agents are risk neutral (i.e. utility is a linear function of
proﬁts);
 Utility functions have no discount factor (i.e. agents value
future reward just as much as current reward);
 Traders act according to the ZI-C strategy;
 The set of buyers and sellers is ﬁxed;
 No new demand or supply appears during a run.
5This heuristic was chosen for its simplicity, but others may be
equally appropriate.None of these assumptions are required by the mechanism,
but they provide a simple scenario in which to evaluate the
mechanism. In what follows, we ﬁrst detail the experimen-
tal settings, the independent variables and the metrics used.
Then, the experiments and results are discussed.
Experiment Settings. For some variables, although they
may impact on the performance of the mechanism in some
way, theresultsinthispaperarenotsensitivetotheirspeciﬁc
values. Therefore, for these variables, reasonable default
values were chosen. These values were identiﬁed by trial
runs and they represent informative scenarios and reason-
able performance (i.e., runs can be completed in acceptable
time). More speciﬁcally, there are 50 buyer and 50 seller
agents. The agents’ endowments, which determine the or-
ders the agents have to complete, are generated from a uni-
form distribution with the range [6;8] for sellers and [10;12]
for buyers. Although it appears that all traders should trans-
act (i.e., it seems that all traders are intra-marginal), this may
not be the case, because not all traders may be matched with
positive expected utility due to execution uncertainty. Thus,
in most scenarios (deﬁned below), there are extra-marginal
traders in the market. The maximum price is set to 15. As
agents do not learn over trading days (see ‘Behavior’), a run
will consist of a single trading day. Experiments consist of
300 runs per condition. The buyer POS is ﬁxed at 1, because
this allows for more insightful analysis, though similar re-
sults occur if failure is two-sided.
IndependentVariables. Therearethreeindependentvari-
ables. The ﬁrst two are the expected value E(pos) and
variance Var(pos) of the probability of success of sellers.
In total, 65 combinations of these variables are run. If
Var(pos) = 0, every seller has POS E(pos). Otherwise,
POS values are drawn from a Beta distribution6 with appro-
priately chosen parameters. The third variable determines
the way in which trust (in sellers) is initialized for the buy-
ers. If trust is CDA-LIKE, a trust of 1 is placed in every
seller. This condition thus exhibits the same behavior as the
traditional CDA. With RANDOM trust, trust values are drawn
from a uniform distribution. Trust can also be initialized as
the MEAN seller POS, or as a PERFECT copy of the POS
value of each seller.
Metrics. Performance is measured as the sum of the actual
(derived) utilities of all buyers, VB, and the sum of the actual
utilities of all sellers, VS. When the optimal allocation has
an expected utility U 6= 0, we may express these measures
6The Beta distribution was chosen because it generates values
in [0;1] and allows us to choose the desired expected value  and
variance 
2, by setting the parameters  and . We may ﬁnd the
parameters  and  from the desired  and 
2 as done in (Teacy
2006):
 =

2   
3
2   ;  =


   :
The constraint that  > 0 bounds 
2 for speciﬁc : 
2 <    
2.
relative to the optimum, as 2VBU 1 and 2VSU 1, respec-
tively.
Now, we analyze the performance of the mechanism, given
that agents have a correct perception of their counterparts’
probabilities of success. The analysis serves three main
goals. First, it conﬁrms that the emergent behavior of the
system is as we expect. Second, we evaluate the behaviour
of the mechanism, with respect to the optimal performance
(as derived under ‘Mechanism Desiderata’) and to the tradi-
tional CDA. Finally, we evaluate the robustness of the mech-
anism to errors in the trust information.
Positive Payoff First of all, calculating the optimal alloca-
tion tells us when a positive payoff is possible. We expect
that given perfect information, on average, the mechanism
will derive a positive utility if that is at all possible.
Hypothesis 1 If for a certain setting of E(pos) and
Var(pos), the optimal buyer utility is positive, so is the ex-
pected performance for the PERFECT trust setting.
For the 60 out of 65 combinations of E(pos) and
Var(pos) where the optimal expected utility is greater than
zero, we do a t-test with the null hypothesis that the mean
buyer utility is equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis is
that the mean is greater than zero. At the  = 0:05 level, we
reject the null hypothesis in 56 of the 60 cases.7
In the cases where the null hypothesis is not rejected (and
the mean buyer utility is thus roughly equal to zero), the es-
timated mean is greater than zero, so we need not consider
the alternative that the actual mean is smaller than zero. Fur-
thermore, these cases all have a very small optimal expected
utility. Hence, in general, the mechanism does derive a pos-
itive expected utility if this is possible.
Comparison to CDA In this experiment we want to show
that not only do we avoid making a loss and that we turn a
proﬁt whenever possible, we also do better than we would if
we would ignore trust information altogether, as in the CDA-
LIKE and the RANDOM conditions.
To this end, Figure 2 shows a typical outcome when
Var(pos) = 0, for different levels of E(pos). The PERFECT
condition does not trade for low values of E(pos), where
a proﬁt is not possible. For higher values of E(pos), the
utility for the PERFECT condition increases more or less lin-
early. For the CDA-LIKE condition, the relationship between
E(pos) and buyer utility is linear, which is what we expect,
since it will ignore the probability of success of sellers al-
together. Hence, it derives a (very large) negative utility for
low E(pos). Beyond a certain threshold, there is very little
distinction between the PERFECT and CDA-LIKE conditions.
This is to be expected, since then transactions are usually de-
sirable and given random (ZI) bidding both conditions will
lead to approximately identical results.
In Figure 3 we see that the inﬂuence of E(pos) on seller
utility is quite different. Clearly, accurate trust information
7If we protect the null hypothesis against spurious results by
setting 
0 = 1   0:95
1=65, the null hypothesis is rejected in 54
cases.E(pos) noise r2 F p
0:10 [0:15;0:50] 0:74 280  0:01
0:30 [0:10;0:50] 0:70 226  0:01
0:50 [0:05;0:25] 0:61 155  0:01
0:80 [0:00;0:50] 0:00 0:15 > 0:50
0:85 [0:00;0:50] 0:00 0:04 > 0:50
0:90 [0:00;0:50] 0:00 0:01 > 0:50
0:95 [0:00;0:50] 0:00 0:01 > 0:50
1:00 [0:00;0:50] 0:00 0:00 > 0:50
Table 1: Linear regression of buyer utility on noise, for
Var(pos) = 0, signiﬁcance tested against F distribution.
r2 is the proportion of the total variance accounted for by
the regression line. F is the value of the F-test statistic for
a linear regression and p is the signiﬁcance of the regression
line given by an F distribution.
interest, leading to losses. The ‘plateau’ where utility is zero
exists because even with some overestimation of the POS,
agents do not see transactions as desirable.
Last, when E(pos)  0:80, the noise level seems to
have very little impact on the total utility derived by buyers,
rather increasing linearly with an increasing E(pos). Lin-
ear regression of buyer utility on noise (Table 1) conﬁrms
this. This may be explained by the fact that in Figure 6,
Var(pos) = 0 and hence there is no beneﬁt in distinguishing
between sellers. The intuition behind this is that the appli-
cation of noise introduces an arbitrary preference for certain
sellers, which is different for each buyer, and transactions
are usually desirable. Thus, the effects of noise on the indi-
vidual cancel out over the entire population.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel resource allocation mech-
anism based on the CDA, that allows the varying degrees of
reliability of trading agents to be taken into account in the
decision making process. We empirically demonstrate the
efﬁciency of our mechanism and, speciﬁcally, its robustness
against increasing execution uncertainty. The standard CDA
mechanism, on the other hand, is shown to break down, with
agents ending up with considerable losses in such a setting.
Moreover, we show that our mechanism is robust to errors in
the trust information employed by agents. Speciﬁcally, per-
formance degrades linearly with the information error. We
believe that our approach is a signiﬁcant step for more real-
istic and uncertain environments in which execution cannot
be guaranteed.
For future work, we ﬁrst will extend our model to cover
settings where agents can enter and leave the system at any
time, where there are more dynamic market shocks (i.e.
drastic changes in demand and supply) and where there is
changing execution uncertainty. Second, we intend to de-
velop more intelligent strategies for traders in the T-CDA,
thatarecapableoflearningfrommarketobservationsandin-
teractions and improving their behaviours over trading days.
TheﬁrststeptodevelopingsuchstrategiesistoextendtheZI
Plus strategy (Cliff and Bruten 1997) to factor in estimates
of execution uncertainties of the competition in its bidding
behaviour. Finally, we intend to develop a trust model and
analyze how its different properties inﬂuence the individual
trader’s efﬁciency and the global social welfare.
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